Subsection (a) of Section 700 of Title 18, United States Code, is amended as follows: (a) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This act was held unconstitutional in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
, 110 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1990) .
Although this case is subsequent to Johnson, its reasoning is not so thoroughly developed.
Johnson is the Court's most detailed explication of the First Amendment protections afforded flag burning.
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S 1338, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. S 8090 (daily ed. July 18, 1989) . The difference between the two situations is only a matter of degree.
If we were to hold that a state may forbid flag burning wherever it is likely to endanger the flag's symbolic role, but allow it whenever burning a flag promotes that role--we would be saying that when it comes to impairing the flag's physical integrity, the flag itself may be used as a symbol--as a substitute for the written or spoken word or as a "short cut from mind to mind"--only in one direction. 
48
Id. at 362.
The Court held that this course would be to dictate the content of political speech.
9
Relying on Schacht, supra, the Court recognized no basis for restricting the "messages" which could be relayed through the use of the flag; to hold otherwise, it contended, would be tantamount to the Court imposing its political philosophy upon the nation. In upholding Levy's conviction the Supreme Court observed that the military community differs from the civilian in that the primary responsibility of the military is to be ready to fight a war if need be.
5
As a consequence, the military has developed a jurisprudence, separate from that governing the civilian sector, which regulates "a much larger segment of 10 U.S.C. Sec. 934. A sample specification for flag burning might read as follows: In that Airman Basic John Doe, 10th Squadron, United States Air Force, did, at XYZ Air Force Base, CO, on or about 1 January 1990, burn a United States flag in the presence of other members of the United States armed forces, with the intent to promote disloyalty among them, which act was disloyal to the United States. This specification is adapted from that prescribed for disloyal statements. The offense focuses both upon the disloyal quality of the statement, meaning that the speaker disavows allegiance to the United States as a political entity, and that the statement be made with the specific intent of promoting disloyalty. Para 72 (b)(c), Manual for Courts-Martial (1984) .
See also 10 U.S.C. Sec. 892, failure to obey a lawful general order or regulation. AFR 110-2, a punitive regulation, forbids an Air Force member from engaging in partisan political activity. In appropriate circumstances this also could be a basis for military prosecution for flag burning. Paragraph 2-a defines "partisan political activity" as "[aictivity supporting or relating to candidates who represent, or issues specifically identified with, national or state political parties or associated or ancillary organizations." disorderly conduct. The effect of the burning must be to prejudice good order and discipline or to bring discredit upon the armed forces. Arguably an act of flag burning by one out of uniform, who does not identify himself as a member of the military, and which is not part of a partisan political activity (see note 64 supra) would not be punishable as disorderly conduct. See, e.g., U.S. v. Davis, 26 M.J. 445 at 448 (CMA 1988).
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